Raychelle Merriam v. Todd Merriam : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1989
Raychelle Merriam v. Todd Merriam : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth M. Hisatake; Attorney for Respondent.
Brent H. Bartholomew; Waine Riches; Utah Legal Services; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Merriam v. Merriam, No. 890484 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2096
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. flfou*^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TODD MERRIAM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
Docket No. 890484-CA 
Argument Priority 
Classification No. 7 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT, SANPETE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE DON V. TIBBS. 
KENNETH M. HISTAKE 
1825 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
telephone: (801) 486-3541 
Attorney for Respondent 
BRENT H. BARTHOLOMEW 
Utah State Bar #4269 
WAINE RICHES 
Utah State Bar #4127 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
455 North University Avenue, 
Suite 100 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: (801) 374-6766 
Toll Free: 1-800-662-1563 
Attorneys for Appellant 
FILED 
MAH 1 1990 
COURT OF APPEALS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND STATE STATUTES 1 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 1 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 2 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CUSTODY AWARD OF THE PARTIES' MINOR SON, DREW MERRIAM 2 
II. RESPONDENT INCORRECTLY ASSUMES THAT BECAUSE 
BOTH PARTIES' TESTIFIED ABOUT THE CHILD CUSTODY 
EVALUATION THAT THE WHOLE REPORT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS 
EVIDENCE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT 3 
III. THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATED THEY ARE BOTH 
FIT PARENTS, BUT BECAUSE RAYCHELLE MERRIAM HAD 
CUSTODY OF DREW FOR A SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SPLIT CUSTODY 6 
CONCLUSION 7 
ADDENDUM 8 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989) 2, 6, 7 
Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986) 6 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452 
(Utah App. 1989) 6 
Constitutional Provisions 
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1 1 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 7 1 
Utah State Rules 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4 903 (1) 1, 4 
Other Authority 
24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 984 (1983) 5, 6 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
TODD MERRIAM, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE RULES 
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1; 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 7; and 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4 903(1). 
(See Addendum for text of the above citations.) 
SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS 
This Court should reverse the trial court's custody award of 
the parties' minor child, Drew Merriam, and award permanent 
custody of Drew to his mother, Raychelle Merriam. Such action is 
permitted by law and is justified by the trial court's blatant 
error. 
Contrary to Respondent's arguments, the trial court erred in 
considering the entire child custody report as evidence and the 
custodial evaluator as an expert witness, although both parties' 
testimony referred to the child custody evaluation. Furthermore, 
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1 
this Court can only consider evidence properly before the trial 
court. 
Both parties are fit parents, but custody of Drew should 
have remained with Raychelle since she had provided a stable 
environment for Drew for a significant period of time. The trial 
court erred by not considering the duration and stability of the 
relationship between Raychelle, Drew, and Carson, Raychelle's 
other son. 
REPLY ARGUMENTS 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE TRIAL COURT'S CUSTODY AWARD OF 
THE PARTIES' MINOR SON, DREW MERRIAM 
While it is true that one remedy Paryzek v. Paryzek permits 
is remanding a case back to trial court for further findings, the 
other available and proper remedy for this matter is to reverse 
the Sixth District Court's egregious, split custody award, as a 
matter of law. See Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78, 82-84 (Utah 
App. 1989). First, the trial court's split custody decision was 
improperly and heavily weighted upon Raychelle's unsubstantiated, 
extramarital sexual relationships. See Appellant's Brief 
(hereinafter referred to as "A.") 7-12. The trial court also 
erred in not considering Raychelle the primary caretaker of Drew 
during the parties' lengthy separation. See A. 15-16. Next, the 
trial court improperly considered the child custody evaluation as 
evidence, although the report was not properly admitted into 
evidence, nor was the evaluator qualified and called as an expert 
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witness at trial. See A. 13-15. Finally, the trial court erred 
in not considering the prior, stable relationship developed 
between Drew, Raychelle, and Carson, Raychelle's other son. See 
A. 16-17. 
As a matter of law, this Court should reverse the Sixth 
District's custody award of the parties' minor child, Drew 
Merriam, to Todd Merriam and award permanent custody of Drew to 
Raychelle. 
II. RESPONDENT INCORRECTLY ASSUMES THAT BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES 
TESTIFIED ABOUT THE CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATION THAT THE WHOLE 
REPORT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS EVIDENCE PROPERLY BEFORE THE TRIAL 
COURT THIS COURT 
During the course of this matter, Raychelle's legal 
representative has been Utah Legal Services, Inc. The first 
attorney assigned to Raychelle's case was Barbara E. Ochoa, 
although Mrs. Ochoa did not sign any pleadings. R. 1, 10, 12, 14, 
and 15. John Kelly West was Raychelle's second attorney and 
represented her at the August 20, 1988, Order to Show Cause 
hearing. R. 17 and 19. Brent H. Bartholomew was Raychelle's 
attorney at trial. T. 2. 
On September 15, 1988, Raychelle's attorney, Mr. West, filed 
with the trial court a Motion for Custody Evaluation, and a 
supporting memorandum, asking the trial court to appoint the 
Division of Family Services (D. F. S.), Utah State Department of 
Social Services. R. 29-32. The Motion for Custody Evaluation 
also requested that costs for the custody evaluation be assessed 
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"according to [the parties'] financial ability pursuant to the 
Division's sliding scale." R. 29. 
Todd's attorney, Kenneth M. Hisatake, responded to 
Raychelle's Motion for Custody Evaluation by not objecting to the 
motion, as long as D. F. S. conducted the evaluation because Todd 
had "limited income, and [was] unable to pay for such evaluation 
services." R. 33-34; see also Respondent's Brief (hereinafter 
referred to as "R. B.") 4 and 14. 
On October 24, 1990, Raychelle's new attorney, Mr. 
Bartholomew, filed with the trial court a Request for Ruling on 
the Motion for Custody Evaluation. R. 35-36. On October 27, 
1990, the trial court granted the motion, and entered an Order 
for Custody Evaluation appointing D. F. S. to conduct the Merriam 
custody evaluation. R. 37-38. 
Initially, D. F. S. assigned a social services worker who 
did not have the minimum qualifications to conduct a child 
custody evaluation. See Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-
903(1). Later, John Bagley, a licensed social worker, was 
assigned to the Merriam evaluation. See R. B. 14. 
At trial, Raychelle testified that she had undergone a 
custodial evaluation with Mr. Bagley; that Mr. Bagley had only 
paid Raychelle one 40-minute visit (although Mr. Bagley did say 
he would come back, but he never did); that, to her knowledge, 
Mr. Bagley never checked out the references Raychelle gave him; 
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and that Raychelle had read Mr, Bagley's report, and the report 
contained many material mistakes. T. 34-36. When Todd was asked 
on cross-examination, about one of the statements in Mr. Bagley's 
report, Todd's attorney objected to how the question was phrased 
and indicated Mr. Bagley's report spoke for itself. T. 77. 
Raychelle's attorney did not continue his line of questioning 
because the report did speak for itself: Mr. Bagley's report had 
not been formally, nor was it ever, introduced into evidence, and 
the trial court could not properly consider information about the 
report, except that information which would later be contained in 
the Merriam trial transcript. See T. 1, 15-16, and 78. 
Todd argues that because Raychelle's attorney questioned her 
regarding "the evaluation and report" and cross-examined Todd 
about the report, the trial court was correct in considering 
everything in Mr Bagley's report. Todd's Response Brief, 
however, does not address the fact that Mr. Bagley was not 
present at trial, let alone called as an expert witness, nor was 
his "Child Custody Evaluation" ever formally admitted into 
evidence.1 See also R. B. 14-15 and A. 13-14. Todd's Response 
1
 In some jurisdictions, the court may, in the exercise of 
its judicial discretion or pursuant to statutory authority, cause 
an independent investigation to be made in custody proceedings in 
order to obtain information material to the issue. Nevertheless, 
the parties cannot be deprived of any of the usual attributes of 
a fair trial in open court; the award of custody must be based on 
evidence heard in open court in observance of requirements of due 
process of law, rather than on information obtained from a 
private investigation. Thus the investigator who makes a report 
should be placed on the stand as a witness, and be subject to 
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Brief even improperly includes Mr. Bagley's "Child Custody 
Evaluation" as an exhibit, although this Court has declared: 
[W]e consider only facts properly before the trial court. . . . " 
Territorial Savings & Loan Association v. Baird, 781 P.2d 452, 
456 (Utah App. 1989). 
Because Mr. Bagley's "Child Custody Evaluation" was never 
properly before the trial court, this Court should not now 
consider the report as evidence. 
III. THE PARTIES DEMONSTRATED THEY ARE BOTH FIT PARENTS, BUT 
BECAUSE RAYCHELLE MERRIAM HAD CUSTODY OF DREW FOR A SIGNIFICANT 
PERIOD OF TIME, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING SPLIT CUSTODY 
The parties have both shown that they have been and can be 
fit parents. Nevertheless, from the time the parties separated 
in April 1988, until after the Merriam trial was held in August 
1989, Raychelle was Drew's custodial parent. 
This Court has held that "in custody determinations, trial 
courts must examine a child's need for stability, and therefore, 
consider prior custody arrangements, and the potential harm to 
the child if the arrangement is changed." Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 
P.2d 78, 83 (Utah App. 1989); see also Pusev v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 
117, 120 (Utah 1986). This Court further stated in Paryzek that 
when one parent has had temporary custody of a child for a 
examination and cross-examination; and statements on the stand or 
in his report which are hearsay should be excluded, unless a 
statute makes the report admissible as evidence regardless of the 
nature of the statements therein. [Footnotes omitted.] 24 Am. 
Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 984 (1983) at 973-974. 
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lengthy period of time, "that factor becomes one of relatively 
greater importance in determining permanent custody. Id. 
The trial court in not awarding Raychelle permanent custody of 
Drew did not even consider—let alone give relatively greater 
importance to—Raychelle having had temporary custody of Drew 
continuously for 16 months, almost half of Drew's life, following 
the parties' separation. See A. 4 and 15-17. Neither did the 
trial court consider the potential harm that would befall Drew if 
his custody were switched from Raychelle to Todd. See A. 15-17. 
Consequently, the trial court erred in awarding permanent custody 
of Drew to Todd, instead of Raychelle. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reason's stated in Appellant's Brief and this Reply 
Brief, this Court should reverse the Sixth District Court's 
permanent custody award of the parties' minor child, Drew 
Merriam, to Todd Merriam and should reunite Drew with Raychelle 
and Carson Draper, Raychelle's other son, by granting permanent 
custody of Drew to Raychelle, as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted this XyT day of February, 1990. 
—^xu^yy TJ^ f 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By Brent H. Bartholomew and 
Waine Riches 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Raychelle Merriam 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on February 28, 1990, I mailed the following 
by first class mail through the United States Postal Service: 
Eight true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Reply Brief, to: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
c/o Janice Ray 
Deputy Clerk 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102; and 
Four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Reply Brief, to: 
Mr. Kenneth M. Hisatake 
Attorney for Respondent 
1825 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105. 
Dated this 9 *>f day of February, 1990. 
BRENT H. BARTHOLOMEW 
Attorney for Appellant, 
Raychelle Merriam 
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ADDENDUM 
United States Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1 
Utah Constitution, art. I, § 7 
Rules of Judicial Administration, Rule 4 903(1) 
9 
CONSTITUTION .OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT XIV' 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — 
Equal protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citi-
zens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTO 
Sec. 7. [liue process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or prop 
erty, without due process of 1 aw, i w» 
RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Rule 4-903. Uniform custody evaluations. 
Intent: 
To establish uniform guidelines for the preparation 
of custody evaluations. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the district and juvenile 
courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Custody evaluations shall be performed by per--
sons with the following minimum qualifications: 
(A) Social -Work Evaluations shall be per-
formed by social workers licensed by the state m-
which they practice. 
(B) Psychological Evaluations shal* be per-
formed by psychologists licensed by the state ui 
which they practice. 
• (C) Psychiatric examinations7shall be per-
formed by a ^ licensed physician with:a specialty 
in psychiatry.. 
